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champions as the only communications forum available to the public
which is not subservient to either the owner's investments or the threat
of lost advertisers.
ARTHUR B. HANsoN*
THE WARREN COURT. By ARCHIBALD Cox.' Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1968. Pp. 142. $4.95.
With the prospective completion of Chief Justice Warren's ad-
ministration on the Supreme Court of the United States, the summary
view of the past fifteen years presented here by Professor Cox is par-
ticularly timely. It is the most recent in a list' which will almost cer-
tainly proliferate in the immediate future, but for a succinct and in-
telligent summary of the major constitutional decisions of the Warren
period there will be few commentaries now or later which will be its
peer.
Although it is almost endemic in American public affairs to subject
the Supreme Court to a running fire of criticism-some of the com-
mentary of the New Deal period' was virulent enough to leave still-
smouldering embers-the abuse which has been heaped on Earl War-
ren has only been exceeded by that suffered by John Marshall. While
this reviewer has no doubt that history will rank these two men as
the greatest Chief Justices to date, it is a poor commentary on Ameri-
can life that the ultimate value of their services must be stated in in-
verse proportion to the invective they have incurred.
As Professor Cox points out, much of the excoriation of Warren
has come from an extremist fringe while "the plan to impeach Chief
Justice Marshall was a plank in the political program of the Jeffer-
sonian Democrats." The highway posters, bumper stickers, matchbook
covers and other media of propaganda against the Warren Court have
been a shameful manifestation of extremism which has unfortunately
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tarred many a sincere and fair-minded conservative in the process. For
rational conservative criticism of the activist program of the Warren
Court has served the valuable function of a catalyst in our maturing
political philosophy, and to have it smirched by the work of anony-
mous rightists is to dilute the effectiveness of the catalytic agent.
With the projected retirement of Chief Justice Warren, the attack
on the nomination of his successor in the United States Senate has pro-
vided another unattractive episode in the history of the Court. Here,
where rational conservatives have their most legitimate opportunity
to express their dissatisfaction with the constitutional jurisprudence of
the present, a claque of purely partisan politicians has compromised
the integrity of the conservative critique almost as much as the ranting
propagandists of the hinterland. At the same time, however, the ra-
tional conservatives have introduced a degree of irrationality into their
own arguments; their demands for "law and order" directed at the
nomination of Mr. Justice Fortas are of a tenor to suggest that they
have not even been aware of his advocacy of substantially the same
thing.4
The legitimate criticism of the Warren Court's activism is a restate-
ment of the age-old question in American political history: Should
the judiciary (or can the judiciary) abstain from participating in the
policy-implementing processes of national affairs? The answer is sug-
gested by the fact that throughout most of its history the Court did
not, and probably could not, do so; whereupon its critics charge it
with "judicial lawmaking" and its supporters with responsibility for
"judicial statesmanship." This is the fundamental issue in the War-
ren Court's jurisprudence; yet, as Professor Cox points out:
(1) The Court's most creative role has been played either in
areas which have always been the special prerogative of the
judiciary, such as criminal procedure and libel, or else in areas
which the legislative branch has neglected, such as school de-
segregation and reapportionment.
(2) The legislative measures invalidated by the Warren Court
were rarely based upon careful study of social and economic
needs of the community, and, except in the case of massive re-
sistance to desegregation, were rarely supported by much long-
range popular sentiment.
(3) The Court has been noticeably careful to avoid square
conflicts, if it can, even in the area of the First Amendment ...
4. FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1968).
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A similar note runs through some of the cases voiding convic-
tions for contempt of Congress and even of State legislatures: the
primary effort has been to make the investigating committees com-
ply with their own rules .... 1
Much myth has grown up around the motivations and objectives of
the Warren Court; Brown v. Board of Education,6 from the first term
of the Court, has been cited as evidence of a conscious plan to reshape
the national social structure. Few bother to recall that the case was
fully argued under the Vinson Court-or that, in the opinion in
Brown and other major cases of that period, the Court was unanimous.,
In the same manner, Baker v. Cart and its successor cases had been
substantially anticipated in the jurisprudence of the past dozen terms
of the Court.10
Yet there can be no denying that the judicial decisions had the
effect of filling a political vacuum; if this is intrusion into the inde-
pendent powers of other branches of government, the question may
fairly be asked, Is this the fault of the judiciary, or of the other
branches which have defaulted on their responsibilities? Professor
Cox (and this reviewer) are persuaded that it is not activism on the
part of the Court, but inactivity on the part of the legislative and per-
haps executive branches, which has magnified these issues into a con-
servative crisis.
If one may measure "activism" by the overruling of settled
precedents and the establishment of new constitutional doctrines
[says Professor Cox], the Warren Court has been extraordinarily
"activist" in the field of criminal procedure. . . There is room
for honest debate as to whether such decisions as Miranda" go
too far in correcting the acknowledged evil.... Despite occasional
excesses, the net effect has been extraordinarily important reform
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in the administration of criminal justice, in the States where re-
form was most needed, within an unusually short span of time.12
"The costs of the Court's activism must be reckoned in long-range
institutional terms," Professor Cox concedes. "The rapidity of the doc-
trinal changes and the readiness of a bare numerical majority of the
Justices to overturn recent precedents immediately upon a change in
the membership of the Court do no service to the ideal of law as
something distinct from the arbitrary preferences of individuals." Yet,
as the author might have pointed out, this process of rapid reversal or
overruling was something that had actually reached its zenith in the
Stone Court, 3 and was a product of the pent-up intellectual energies
which had been massing for the past half-century.
"Only history will know whether the Warren Court has struck the
balance right," the author concludes. For himself, he adds, "I am confi-
dent that historians will write that the trend of decisions during the
1950's and 1960's was in keeping with the mainstream of American his-
tory-a bit progressive but also moderate, a bit humane but not senti-
mental, a bit idealistic but seldom doctrinaire, and in the long run es-
sentially pragmatic-in short, in keeping with the true genius of our
institutions." 14 This reviewer heartily concurs.
WILLIAM F. SWINDLER*
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